[o]n paper, the ECB enjoys full independence. Its Board members cannot be revoked and their long eight-year mandate cannot be renewed, so that they do not have to please member governments. Yet, they reluctantly violated the no-bailout clause to please member governments.
Then, it took three years to decide on the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) Programmewhich brought immediate relief -because some member governments opposed it. For the same reason, they started QE seven years after the Fed, probably contributing to the longest period ever of no growth in Europe.
Taken to the extreme, what Wyplosz describes is a dynamics of total ECB subordination to (some) member states. While possible in principle, this type of relationship seems unlikely in our case, if nothing else because it is inconsistent with the several cases of monetary policy disagreements between the ECB leadership and the German government-arguably the most powerful among the Bank's principals-in which the latter has found itself on the losing side.
More probably, who sees ECB politicisation as a deficit of independence has a more balanced and nuanced type of relationship in mind, in which the Bank is exposed to political pressures on the part of member states, but at the same time retains a significant degree of freedom in deciding whether or not to grant "favours" to this or that government as a response to such pressures. So defined, this conception of politicization overlaps to a great extent with the next dichotomy.
Dichotomy #2: Politicisation vs impartiality
A second part of the debate on ECB politicisation takes the latter to mean a violation of the principle of impartiality, whereby the Bank's decisions should not generate winners and losers. The beneficiaries of this type of politicization can be of different kinds: for instance, Genovese, Schneider and Wassmann (2016) , attribute a political character to those ECB actions, primarily the QE, that have ameliorated the conditions of the most distressed segments of the Eurozone population. 4 Most often, however, the distributive effects of ECB policies are interpreted, again, in interstate terms, i.e. benefiting certain countries or governments over others. This is, for instance, the case of the OMT, an instrument designed to buy (under conditionality) bonds issued by specific countries in order to ease pressures on their budgets and bond markets. As Lombardi and Moschella (2016: 863) put it, [s] ince the programme implied support for sovereign bonds in only a few countries, rather than comprehensive support across the euro area as a whole, it politicized those "deep cultural differences" that exist within the euro area.
Unsurprisingly, quantitative easing too is often interpreted along these lines, namely as a political decision on the part of the ECB that helps Eurozone's weaker economies over those (usually northern) member states that can do without the QE.
Of course, peripheral economies can also be on the losing side of ECB policies. As mentioned above, when the ECB suspended ELA to Greece, many saw this as a politicised move against Alexis Tsipras's government. Wren-Lewis (2015) , for example, argues that [l] imiting funding on 28th June was the Greek government's punishment for failing to agree to the Troika's terms and calling a referendum the day before. The ECB was not, and never has been, a neutral actor just following the rules of a good central bank.
Similarly, the Bank's famous summer 2011 letter to the Italian government, urging the latter to implement a number of structural reforms to ensure the sustainability of the country's finances, has been time and again depicted by Silvio Berlusconi and his supporters as a political manoeuvre that facilitated Mr Berlusconi's later removal from power in favour of the more EU-friendly Mario Monti (Benvenuti 2017).
As intuitive and rhetorically effective the notion of politicisation as partiality is, from a conceptual standpoint it is problematic. Even assuming that the distributive consequences of the ECB's actions can always be clearly detected-which is a big if, especially as one ventures beyond the short term-the fact remains that, as Fernández-Albertos (2015) notes, virtually anything a central bank does has some distributive effects, even though some are more tangible than others. So, unless we are ready to argue that the ECB is always politicised, partiality does not seem, by itself, a good basis on which to ground the concept.
A more viable interpretation of politicisation-as-partiality should then rely not only on the effects of the ECB's decisions but also, and above all, on the motives underpinning them.
Put differently, the Bank's actions should not be seen as politicised when they generate winners and losers, but when they do so on the basis of a deliberate decision rather than as a by-product of economic measures. This more comprehensive view may well be what most of those adopting this conception of politicisation have in mind. Yet, the fact that central bankers' intentions are hardly ever brought to the fore and properly discussed remains a problem, as shall be seen more in detail later on.
Dichotomy #3: Politicisation vs convention
A third version of ECB politicisation associates the latter to deviations from conventional policy means and objectives. In a way, this view of politicisation is the mirror image of the first: in that case, the ECB's "pathology" was its scarce independence vis-à-vis its political principals; in this, it is the Bank's expansion of its independence to the point of shirking the mission assigned to it by member states, and formulating its own policies in an uncontrolled fashion (Elgie 2002).
The most obvious way in which the Bank's conventional boundaries can be defined is legally, as the Bank's price stability mandate (Art. 127(1) TFEU) plus other Treaty rules delimiting its scope of action, most notably the "no bailout" clause (Art. 125 TFEU).
Commenting on the reception of the ECB's Securities Market Programme (SMP) in Germany, for instance, Högenauer and Howarth (2016: 12) argue that "[t]he diversion from the pursuit 5 While the ECB has become generally more transparent in recent years (for instance by increasing the frequency of its hearings before the European Parliament), it continues to follow a 30-year rule for the archival release of its records. During that term, applications can be filed to access specific documents, subject to a number of exceptions set by the Bank. Contrast this, for instance, with the Fed's policy of publishing complete transcripts of its Federal Open Market Committee with a five year lag. Methodologically, studying politicisation through language is located somewhere in between the two previous approaches. Data plenitude and analytical flexibility are two clear advantages of this research avenue, as there is no shortage of text of various kinds to be combined and analysed in ways that best fit the analyst's needs. Language can, for example, be used to investigate long term preference trends as well as specific ECB decisions, and be processed through a variety of techniques, ranging from the interpretive study of discourse to automated and quantitative content analysis.
On the downside, while language is arguably a closer proxy for preferences than bankers' networks, it remains an indirect, and therefore potentially less accurate way to assess politicisation than interviews and surveys. In addition, because language is, among other things, the primary way in which the ECB presents itself publicly, in certain cases this approach may present the same truthfulness issues as interviews, and ultimately a similar risk of underestimating the Bank's politicisation.
Conclusion
The politicisation of the ECB is a central and recurrent topic in debates on the European Union after the crisis, yet one that still suffers from a considerable degree of conceptual vagueness. This article has brought some order within the theme of ECB politicisation by mapping and appraising existing uses of this term, proposing a better alternative based on central bankers' policy-making preferences, and finally indicating three strategies for the operationalisation of politicisation based on, respectively, elite interviews and surveys, the analysis of central bankers' networks, and the study of ECB language. Using these methodological tools intelligently-that is remaining fully aware of their possibilities and limits-can take us a long way towards discussing the topic of ECB politicisation with the clarity it deserves.
While this study has focused primarily on the definition and detection of politicisation, a few concluding remarks can be made about possible research avenues to be built on the preference-based approach proposed here. Three such avenues, in particular, seem both salient and underrepresented in the emerging research programme described above. The first is a closer and critical analysis of the relationship between crisis and politicisation. Further research should keep problematizing this connection not only, as already suggested here, by checking the veracity of ECB politicisation where it has been mostly assumed in recent years, but also, and conversely, by investigating the extent to which politicisation should be seen as a phenomenon emerging predominantly in times of economic and institutional crisis. This question could lead to interesting research into the existence of politicised policy-making by the ECB before the euro crisis, as well as its possible persistence after it, as Eurozone economies gradually return to normal times.
Connected to these questions, the preference-based approach described in this article could also be taken as a starting point for more fine-grained inquiries into the nature of ECB politicisation than conducted here. Key questions are, for example, what particular set of societal and political goals may be factored in policy deliberations by central bankers; which constituencies and stakeholders may be de facto prioritised in ECB decision-making behind the veil of formal neutrality; and whether all these politicisation dynamics, if detected, vary across components of the Eurosystem.
Finally, more attention should be devoted to the normative questions raised by the possible politicisation of the ECB. One particularly salient aspect in this area concerns the legitimacy dilemmas that may arise during certain junctures between the ECB's duty to operate in a fully depoliticised and mandate-bound fashion and its pursuit of objectives that, while not strictly speaking part of its remit, may nonetheless have high political importance, such as safeguarding the values and stability (and perhaps even existence) of the EU as a polity.
